responsibility for food safety rests in a dozen different regulatory agencies, operating under at least thirty-five different statutes.3 At least eight major agencies are charged with responsibility for reducing the risk of exposure to hazardous substances under more than two dozen statutes, each with their own structure and standards.4 Congress has created more than 200 committees and subcommittees, many of which oversee the development of regulatory policy.5
By some estimates, the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency has had as many as ninety congressional committees and subcommittees overseeing its work.6
Regulatory agencies not only report to Congress, but also find themselves repeatedly wrangling with a variety of other actors and institutions, including the Office of Management and Budget, the White House, the courts, and the media.7 Internally, these same regulatory agencies are divided across program areas and by professional specialization. Moreover, the internal and external fragmentation of policy authority plays itself out at the level of state and local governments, which interact with the federal government and add another layer of complexity to the making and implementation of regulatory policy. Given the extensive fragmentation of policymaking authority, it should come as no surprise that regulation in the United States appears so complex and incoherent.
In their article, Predictably Incoherent Judgments, Cass Sunstein, Daniel Kahneman, David Schkade, and Ilana Ritov advance a cognitive explanation for incoherence in government regulation. 8 They argue that decisionmakers tend to think within narrowly-conceived categories and have difficulty translating their normative judgments into concrete terms, such as dollar amounts.9 Both of these factors, they suggest, result in patterns of micro-level ("(T]here are over 100 federal agencies and subagencies with regulatory mandates from Congress. They chum out 4,500 new rules each year.").
3. INSTITUTE OF MEDICINE & NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, ENSURING SAFE FOOD: FROM PRODUCTION TO CONSUMPTION 26 ( 1998), available at http://books.nap.edu/books/0309065593/html/26.html (noting that "[a]t least a dozen federal agencies implementing more than 35 statutes make up the federal part of the food safety system").
4. See, e.g. , STEPHEN BREYER, BREAKING THE VICIOUS CIRCLE 8 ( 1993) ("[R]egulation designed to screen out risky substances, including cancer-causing substances, is embodied in many different regulatory programs-indeed in at least twenty-six different statutes administered by at least eight different agencies."). judgments that make little sense when viewed from a macro-level perspective across different categories. They argue that decisions that seem sensible when viewed in isolation, or within a single category, result in patterns that are globally inconsistent or suboptimal.
Sunstein et al. rightly call attention to the effects of cognition on regulatory policymaking, and especially to problems associated with narrow, ad hoc decisionmaking. In this essay, I argue that the effects of cognitive limitations are probably even more pronounced than Sunstein et al. 's article suggests. They argue that cognitive tendencies such as category-bound thinking lead to incoherent regulatory policies, but I will argue that, in addition, these same kinds of cognitive constraints can affect judgments about incoherence itself. If people have a tendency to focus on one category at a time in making judgments, then evaluations that judge different policies to be incoherent will tend to be bounded as well. Consequently, it will be still more difficult than Sunstein et al.' s article seems to imply to design and evaluate institutional reforms to reduce incoherence in regulatory policy.
In the following pages, I first introduce a tension between what I refer to as instrumental and comparative coherence, arguing that variation in policies that appears to make little sense when policies are compared with each other may be quite sensible for instrumental reasons. I then examine Sunstein et al. 's claim to have discovered striking incoherence in the penalty levels across regulatory statutes. I argue that when considered from a broader perspective the apparently obvious incoherence in some of these penalty levels is not nearly as obvious as it first seems. Finally, I argue that the same kind of bounded evaluation problem arises when regulations are judged to be incoherent based on variation in their cost-effectiveness.
Regulatory policies that appear incoherent when compared along one dimension or evaluated with only one purpose in mind will not necessarily be properly viewed as incoherent once other dimensions or purposes are taken into account. Indeed, because the conditions underlying regulatory policy are both varied and complex, judgments about incoherence will be unavoidably difficult (and even sometimes incoherent) since regulatory policies vary along multiple dimensions and people have a tendency to focus only on one dimension at a time.
I. CONCEPTUALIZING REGULATORY INCOHERENCE
Fragmented regulatory institutions make it more likely that regulatory policy will vary in its standards, procedures, penalties, and resources, such that seemingly similar cases will not always be treated alike. Sunstein et al. frame much of their discussion of regulatory incoherence around the considerable variation in the civil penalties that administrative agencies can impose on those [Vol. 54: 1217 who have violated federal statutes and regulations.10 Numerous statutes permit administrative agencies to impose civil, and sometimes criminal, penalties on regulated actors. The statutes typically provide for maximum penalties that can be imposed, and the pattern of maximum penalties across federal regulatory agencies varies considerably, from $500 to as much as $1,000,000 for certain criminal penalties. 11 Some statutes place maximum limits on penalties per violation, while others impose limits per day of violation and still others stipulate minimum penalties that must be imposed for certain types of violations.
As Sunstein et al. note, the pattern of civil penalties across regulatory regimes is not something which has garnered a great deal of attention from scholars and policymakers.12 In 1990, for example, Congress increased the maximum civil penalties for OSHA violations but, as would be predicted from Sunstein et al. 's argument, legislators apparently failed to make any explicit comparison to other agencies' penalties. The legislative record only shows that legislators emphasized how much more revenue could be raised by increasing OSHA's penalties and how low the earlier penalties had been relative to the importance of worker safety.
Notwithstanding the apparent lack of legislative debate comparing the size of different penalties, in other contexts scholars and analysts have sometimes paid attention to differences in the size of administratively-imposed penalties.
One of the earliest studies of civil penalties included a chart of different agencies' penalties and noted the "varying amounts of money" associated with civil penalties that "resulted from a series of relatively unstudied, ad hoc 21. Actually, the penalty for handicapped parking violations has no daily limit, but the penalty for day care violations does. Also, the penalties for Class III violations of day care regulations-those violations which do not place children at risk of harm-is only $50 per day, slightly less than for general parking violations in New York City. Regulatory outcomes that are incoherent can be justifiably criticized as inefficient, unfair, or perhaps both. From the standpoint of overall welfare, incoherent outcomes fail to deploy resources in a socially optimal way, such as by bringing too little regulatory attention to bear on the most significant public problems and too much attention on the least significant. 24 Incoherent regulatory policies can also result in situations where some individuals find themselves more protected than similarly situated others and where some individuals and firms are more scrutinized by governmental oversight than are similarly situated others.
Regulations "do not make sense" in a variety of ways. I will distinguish between two types of coherence: instrnmental coherence and comparative coherence.25
To test for instrumental coherence is to consider whether regulatory strategies or means are consistent with appropriate regulatory goals or ends. A regulatory policy fails to make instrumental sense if it fails to achieve its objectives or if it produces more harm than good. Regulatory policies are often criticized for being instrumentally incoherent because they are ineffectual, produce unintended consequences, or impose far too many costs for the social benefits they achieve. 26
Judging a regulation to be instrumentally incoherent depends only on making a judgment about the particular regulation. While knowledge of the performance of other regulations may provide clues that help in judging the instrumental coherence of another regulation, a judgment about the instrumental coherence of a given regulation can be made in isolation of judgments about other regulations. In contrast, a regulation fails to make sense comparatively if it turns out to be inconsistent with other regulations of either the same general type or other types altogether. This inconsistency could arise between ends, between means, or between the relationships between means and ends.
Sunstein et al. usefully distinguish further between two types of comparative coherence: within category and across category coherenceY
Regulations or their outcomes can be said to be coherent within category if they are consistent with other regulations or outcomes of their same general type.28 Regulations or their outcomes can be said to be coherent across 24. Of course, uniform policies can also result in a misallocation of resources when they are applied across a varied ran ge of conditions. For a discussion of the unreasonableness of applying uniform rules, see EuGENE To illustrate these distinctions, return to the example of civil penalties for regulatory violations. Such penalties would be judged instrumentally incoherent if they were set at a level that failed to achieve the goal of reducing the socially undesirable ends that they were intended to deter. For instance, we might imagine a world in which the maximum penalty for a serious violation of an OSHA regulation was only a nickel per year. 30 It would "make no sense"
instrumentally to adopt such a ridiculously low penalty because that level would effectively have the same deterrent effect as no penalty at alP1 On the other hand, a maximum penalty of a nickel per year could be viewed as comparatively consistent if that penalty did not seem out of line with the penalties for other types of violations. If the maximum penalties for non serious OSHA violations were less than a nickel per year, then having maximum penalties for serious OSHA violations of a nickel per year would seem comparatively coherent within the category of OSHA violations. If maximum penalties for other less serious regulatory violations outside c+ OSHA were also lower, then the nickel-per-year penalty could be thought of as comparatively coherent across categories.
In an ideal world we would expect a regulatory system to achieve both instrumental and comparative coherence. 32 Yet achieving both is challenging in no small part because it requires decisionmakers to obtain competing types of information.
Instrumental coherence tends to call for depth, while comparative coherence tends to call for breadth. To achieve instrumental coherence, regulatory designers focus on solving the problem at hand, on identifying concrete strategies to achieve relatively narrow regulatory goals.
Comparative coherence, in contrast, requires decisionmakers to step back and assess the landscape, to make comparisons.
To be sure, efforts aimed at standardizing information collection and decision modeling across policy areas can lower the costs of making comparisons, and they are to be desired for this very reason.33 Yet even with much needed efforts of standardization, information will never be costless. invest in information gathering, and one such choice is between gathering the information needed to achieve instrumental coherence and gathering that needed to achieve comparative coherence.
For some purposes, though, it will be necessary to invest in both kinds of information. If we are interested in assessing the comparative coherence of regulatory strategies, including the size of civil penalties, information about instrumental coherence will be necessarily relevant. This is because regulators often must adapt policies to different conditions to achieve instrumental coherence, employing different strategies for situations that may be similar in some respects but which differ in others. Since the social and economic conditions for which regulatory standards, practices, and penalties are designed vary, these standards, practices, and penalties also need to vary in order to achieve regulatory goals effectively. A well-crafted, instrumentally coherent system of regulatory policy will therefore exhibit a high degree of variation both within and across regulatory categories, and for this reason will be more likely to appear on the surface to be comparatively incoherent.34 This is not to say that instrumental reasons will always explain variation in regulatory outcomes, but simply that a fair and full assessment of the degree of comparative coherence in a regulatory system should take into account whether there are valid, instrumental reasons why regulatory strategies vary in seemingly incoherent ways.
In other words, to identify comparative incoherence in regulatory strategies it will often be necessary to seek depth as well as breadth. Identifying comparative incoherence in such cases involves consideration of variation in the conditions and constraints across policy areas as well as variation in regulatory outcomes. To judge comparative coherence is therefore to ask whether the differences in these underlying conditions, as well as in the overarching goals, justify differences in regulatory strategies.
II. INCOHERENCE AND CIVIL PENALTIES
Sunstein et al. recognize the difficulties of identifying comparative coherence, but they also suggest that there are "obvious anomalies" across 34. It is quite possible, of course, that seeking instrumental coherence in a variety of separate regulatory realms will lead to genuine comparative incoherence across these realms. Myopic optimization on separate parts of a problem can result in the suboptimization of the larger problem. See GEORGE L. NEMHAUSER & LAURENCE A. WOLSEY, INTEGER AND COMBINATORIAL OPTIMIZATION 60, 393-94 (1988) (describing how "greedy" or "myopic" algorithms generally fail to yield optimal results). Certainly, this is easy to see when judging regulatory outcomes. A regulatory system filled with a series of instrumentally coherent policies aimed at trivial problems, but which left major problems completely unaddressed, would properly be judged incoherent in a comparative sense. For an excellent elucidation of this kind of argument, see BREYER, supra note 4, at II (describing the problem of "tunnel vision," whereby "each employee's individual conscientious performance effectively carries single-minded pursuit of a single goal too far, to the point where it brings about more hann than good"). Individuals may have a tendency to "see" incoherence when on closer examination there is none. The same cognitive tendencies that Sunstein et al.
have so carefully illuminated would lead us to expect that this would occur quite often. If individuals have a tendency to take up problems "one case at a time," they presumably have a tendency to focus only on one factor at a time when making comparisons across categories. This will lead them in some cases to focus on incoherence along one dimension, but to overlook other dimensions that might justify differences across categories.
The general point is that regulatory policies can sensibly and justifiably vary, and that ordinary people's judgments about what they find obviously incoherent may themselves be either incoherent or wrong. When it comes to regulatory violations, there are a number of possible reasons why civil penalties could sensibly vary even if more serious violations are backed up by lower penalties than are less serious violations. When other considerations are taken into account, differences that might seem obviously problematic may well be justified. For example, rather than an obvious case of incoherence, the case of OSHA civil penalties probably better illustrates the difficulties in judging incoherence across categories. Additional factors relevant to identifying incoherence in regulatory penalties would include the following.
A. Existence of Other Liability
In some cases, civil penalties will not be the only financial sanction confronting those who violate regulations. For example, employers who fail to provide a safe workplace can find themselves exposed to more than just the possibility of civil penalties imposed by the federal OSHA. Sometimes those who violate regulations do not even know that they are doing so.
All things being equal, civil penalties against those who unintentionally breach regulations probably do not need to be as large as those 37. See W. KIP VISCUSI, JOHN M. VERNON & JOSEPH E. HARRfNGTON, JR., ECONOMICS OF REGULATION AND ANTITRUST 814 (2d ed. 1995) (noting that OSHA's civil penalties amount to no more than about $25 million per year nationwide, compared with $70 billion in higher wages associated with workplace risks, and workers' compensation premiums of more than $20 billion).
38. In addition to government-imposed liability or penalties, there also can be negative market consequences associated with regulatory violations. Productivity may be diminished in finns that are cited fo r regulatory violations or, alternatively, boosted in those firms that pass regulatory inspections. Workers generally demand higher wages in industries with larger safety risks. Customer reactions or responses by insurers may also be a consideration for finns which are cited for certain kinds of regulatory violations.
39. See 29 U.S.C. § 662 (1999). In those cases where OSHA improperly fai ls to seek injunctive relief, the statute allows employees or their representatives to seek it themselves.
40. See BARDACH & KAGAN, supra note 24, at 53 (noting that injunctive relief imposes an "expense [that] is usually equivalent to a much larger fine than a court would ever impose").
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imposed against knowing or willful violators.41
The seemingly striking disparity between the $7000 OSHA penalty and the $25,000 wild bird penalty appears to be at least partially explainable on this basis.
The $25,000
maximum penalty under the Wild Bird Conservation Act is specifically for any person who "knowingly" violates the relevant regulations or for any person engaged in the business of importing exotic birds, who presumably knows or should know of the regulations.42 The Act assesses a maximum civil penalty of only $500 for a person who otherwise violates its regulations.43 In comparison, OSHA authorizes a maximum penalty of $70,000 for any employer who "willfully" violates worker safety regulations.44 The $7000 maximum penalty is for employers who unintentionally violate the regulations.45 While subtle differences might be drawn between "knowingly" and "willfully," when the state of mind of the violator is taken into account it becomes less clear that the companson between OSHA and Fish and Wildlife Service penalties is incoherent.
D. Distance Between Legal Rule and Outcome of Concern
Regulations aim to reduce undesirable outcomes in the world, but it is often infeasible to set a regulatory standard based directly on the undesirable outcome. Instead, regulators must often write standards that aim either at proxies for the outcome of concern or at other factors believed to be correlated with the outcome of concern.46 Perhaps lower penalties are justified for violations of regulations that rely on proxies or aim at behavior that is only correlated with the ultimate outcome of concern, even though the ultimate outcome may be more serious. Parking next to a fire hydrant does not itself cause fires, while parking in a handicapped parking spot does diminish access for those who are physically challenged. A well-designed regulatory system aimed at worker health and safety may require employers to complete various 41. It is not simply that those who knowingly or willfully violate regulations deserve larger penalties for punitive reasons. Since they knew of the law and broke it anyway, it may take a larger penalty to deter them from future violations or to send an optimal signal to other regulated entities that they should fo llow all the laws they know about. In those cases where violators unknowingly break the law, simply informing them of their obligations can sometimes go a long way toward getting them to achieve compliance and therefore the penalty will not need to be as large. See forms, but completing government-required paperwork presumably is not as serious as the underlying goal of worker safety itself.47
E. Type and Size of Regulatory Targets
The behavioral impact of a civil penalty can vary depending cin the resources of the regulated entity and the economic gains to the firm from contravening the regulation. For this reason, penalties for regulations that target individuals and small businesses need not be set at levels as high as those for other, less serious offenses that govern larger firms.48 In some states, for example, the penalties associated with violating state rules governing the operation of day care facilities are limited to no more than a couple hundred dollars per violation. 49 In contrast, the Commodity Futures Trading Commission can impose up to $100,000 or triple the economic gain for manipulating market prices.50 The Securities and Exchange Commission can impose penalties on firms up to $250,000 or the amount of the economic gains from the violation (whichever is higher) for fraud or manipulation.51 This pattern does not necessarily mean that the well-being of children is valued less than fraud-free securities markets, nor does it mean that the civil penalties across these categories are incoherent. Rather, the pattern across these categories makes better sense if we consider that there are smaller economic gains to be had from violating day care standards than from committing securities fraudY 47. The system of penalties for OSHA violations appears to take this factor into account, as non-serious violations, such as fa ilures to file required paperwork, are distinguished from "serious" violations, which pose a substantial risk to worker safety. 29 U.S.C. § 666(k) (1994) (defining "serious" violations as those for which a "substantial probability that death or serious physical hann could result"). The same statute also allows OSHA to issue a simple notice of violation for "de minimis violations which have no direct or immediate relationship to safety or health." !d. § 658(a). 48 52. An interesting, and perhaps extreme, case of taking into account violators' resources can be found in Finland. Finnish traffic fines vary according to the violator's income-a system which recently resulted in highly-publicized case of a business executive receiving the equivalent of a $103,600 fine fo r driving his motorcycle at 4 7 miles per hour in
F. Probability oj Detecting Violations
The deterrent effect of regulatory penalties depends not merely on their size, but also on the probability that a regulatory agency will detect violations of the applicable regulations. 53 This probability will depend on the amount of inspection resources available to the regulatory agency, the number of regulated entities to be inspected, and the ease with which government inspectors can detect a violation. 54 If less serious violations are harder to detect than more serious violations, regulatory agencies may need larger penalties, all things being equal, to achieve an optimal level of deterrence. 55
G. Probability of Imposing Penalties
Once an agency detects a violation, it must then proceed through a process of imposing that penalty. Penalties that can be assessed directly by a regulatory agency will likely have a higher probability of being imposed than will 241-44 (2000) . That said, this does not mean that the probability of detection is irrelevant to considered judgments about the sensibility of civil penalties fo r regulatory violations. Both regulators and analysts accept that administrative penalties are intended to provide deterrence and to give regulatory officials tools to affect behavior in order to achieve socially desirable goals. Moreover, not everything that is important is immediately understood or valued by the public. Even though Sunstein et al. argue that people have little interest in global coherence, fo r example, they do not conclude that coherence is for that reason irrelevant to the design of good and just public policy.
penalties that require a court determination at the outset in order to be imposed.56 In their study of regulatory enforcement, Eugene Bardach and Robert Kagan noted the trend toward authorizing regulatory agencies to impose penalties without first having to go to court, observing that while "[m]ost agency-assessed civil penalties, such as those imposed by OSHA, are not large, ... they are swift and according to our interviews, are troubling even to very large corporations."57 A penalty presumably does not need to be quite as large if it is swift and certain.58 Those who seek to compare penalties across regulatory categories would do well therefore to consider the differences in how penalties are imposed on violators.
H. Implications fo r Judging Incoherence
As this review of additional considerations suggests, vanat10n in factors other than simply the seriousness of the regulatory goal can justify variation in the amount of civil penalties. Once additional factors such as those described above are taken into account, the differences between OSHA and Fish and Wildlife Service penalties do not appear to be as obviously incoherent at they initially may have seemed. First, the statutory penalties for OSHA violations are in fact substantially higher than the penalties for importing wild birds once the category of OSHA penalties for willful violations is used for comparison.
Second, OSHA penalties are backed up by other significant behavioral incentives for workplace safety, including workers ' compensation and tort liability, whereas penalties for wildlife regulations are not. Finally, unlike the Fish and Wildlife Service, OSHA has injunctive relief available to it that can result in additional, significant costs imposed on firms that threaten worker safety.
Of course, I make no claim to have fully analyzed all the differences between OSHA and Fish and Wildlife Service penalties, let alone the pattern of available or actually imposed penalties across other agencies.59 Nevertheless, 56. See Thunder Basin Coal Co. v. Reich, 510 U. S. 200, 210-11 (1994) (discussing congressional decision to streamline the process of imposing civil penalties under the 1977 Mine Act in order to enhance the deterrent effect of the penalties).
57 . BARDACH & KAGAN, supra note 24, at 52. 58. Moreover, the larger the penalty, the greater the incentive a firm has to contest its imposition, thus reducing the likelihood it will be imposed. 59. It is possible that the statutory maximum levels available to OSHA are too low when compared with those in other risk-based statutes, or that in practice the civil penalties imposed by OSHA and other agencies are less coherent than their statutory maximum levels would appear. We do know, for instance, that the average civil penalty issued by OSHA in some sectors amounts to less than a thousand dollars per violation. See, e.g. , David Wei!, Assessing OSHA Pe1jormance: Evidencefrom the Co nstruction fndusl!y, 20 J. PUB. POL. & taking into consideration a broader range of relevant fa ctors makes it less obvious that disparate penalties make no sense. Furthermore, the reason fo r the difficulty in identifying incoherence of existing regulatory policy is only partly the individual cognitive tendencies emphasized by Sunstein et al.
The difficulty arises because of those tendencies combined with the complexity of regulatory policy and the conditions under which it is established and implemented. As challenging as it can be simply to determine how much more important worker safety is than the protection of wild birds, the cognitive demands become still greater when other dimensions of different regulatory problems are taken into account.
Unlike in the experimental setting, where researchers can control the factors that might affect individual judgments, identifying incoherence in practice demands attention to several dimensions all at once, because diffe rences on one or more of these dimensions can sometimes justify variation in policies and outcomes. As a result, when viewed along one dimension, regulatory policies may appear incoherent, but when other fa ctors are taken into account the policies may well make better sense. Of course, it is also possible that in some cases they will make even less sense. The point is that if we only look at one dimension at a time our judgments of incoherence will themselves be bounded and quite possibly mistaken. Furthermore, since variation across several dimensions will almost always be greater across rather than within regulatory categories, this will exacerbate if not even help explain the difficulties people experience in identifying across-category incoherence.
III. IMPLICATIONS FOR REGULATORY INSTITUTION S
People's tendency to fo cus on just one dimension when judging the coherence of different policies extends beyond the realm of administrative penalties. Some of the most prominent illustrations of regulatory incoherence are studies fo cusing on the cost-effectiveness of different regulations in terms of saving lives. In the 1980s, the Office of Management and Budget released a table purporting to show wide variation in the cost-effectiveness of regulations across various domains, a table which has been revised, expanded, and cited widely in debates over regulatory reform.60 More recently, Tammy Tengs and her colleagues undertook an extensive study which fo und remarkable variation in the costs per life-year-saved across regulatory realms, from a median of $23,000 per life-year-saved at the Federal Aviation Administration to a median MGMT. 65 1, 656 tbl.2 (reporting that the total OSHA inspection of a construction site resulted in penalties of $71 I).
60. See Sunstein et al., supra note 8, at 1198 (noting that the OMB table "has come to dominate many discussions of these problems"). Wide variation in the cost-effectiveness of diffe rent regulations has become a matter of concern because it suggests that society could save more lives fo r the same commitment of resources if government were to reallocate its priorities.63 However, for the purpose of assessing the coherence of regulatory standards, a fo cus on their cost-effe ctiveness in terms of saving lives is actually quite narrow and even potentially misleading. 64 The cost-effe ctiveness analysis that has dominated regulatory reform debates has fo cused attention on only one dimension of these regulations, albeit an important one-namely their impact on saving lives. A better approach would be to use an efficiency test that takes into account all the costs and benefits of diffe rent regulations.
Regulations can achieve a wide range of social benefits over and above saving lives. As Tengs and her coauthors acknowledge, "interventions that reduce fa tal injuries in some people may also reduce nonfatal injuries in others ;
interventions designed to control toxins in the environment may have short tetm effects on [saving lives] , but also long-term cumulative effects on the ecosystem."65 As a result, cost variation that appears to make no sense when viewed simply in terms of lives saved could, in principle, make sense when these other social benefits are taken into account. 66 After all, a given regulation may well save only a few lives but prevent a vast number of nonfatal injuries or illnesses. It might make sense to adopt a regulation that would cost hundreds of millions of dollars per life saved if the regulation would also cure the common cold or prevent other more debilitating but nonfatal diseases.
For this reason, the overall coherence of risk-related regulatory standards would be better judged by taking a broader perspective, just as in the case of civil penalties. Such a broad view would not only take into account all the social benefits, but would also take into consideration factors such as distributional equity.67 Consideration of all the relevant factors may well make sense out of regulatory standards that appear to make little sense when viewed along just one dimension, such as cost-effectiveness. 58
Of course, no one has yet shown that the overall pattern of risk regulation currently in place is, all things considered, an optimal and coherent one, and it would be surprising if anyone could. The available evidence certainly appears to indicate otherwise. 59 My point here is simply that judgments of regulatory supra note 63, at 208, 229 ("[C]alculations that rely on cost-effectiveness to reallocate resources may be misleading because the ordering of cost-effec tiveness measures may not be highly correlated with the ordering of net benefits associated with those measures."). In addition, even when focusing only on mortality reduction, it may matter whether the lives to be saved from a regulation are younger or older persons' lives. For this reason, some analyses value mortality benefits based on life-years rather than just lives saved. CHI. L. REv. I, 9 (I 995) ("Regulations should be evaluated not only in terms of aggregate costs and benefits, but also in terms that reflect democratic judgments about qualitative differences among qualitatively different risks.").
68. People may think, fo r example, that it is especially important to protect poor children from a certain risk in a geographically isolated area, and they may be willing to devote an unusually large amount to ensure that protection. What seems to be a cognitive error may tum out, on refl ection, to be a judgment of value, and a judgment that can survive reflection. Sunstein, supra note 64, at 1073; see also Celia Campbeli-Mohn & John S. Applegate, Learning from NEPA : Guidelines fo r Responsible Risk Legislation, 23 HARV. ENVTL. L. REv. 93, II I ( 1999) ("[I]t is unwise to set out a single substantive standard for all regulation in the multifarious areas of fe deral activity without a full inquiry into the important differences among the various areas.").
69. For example, Robert Hahn has attempted to parse through the often incomplete data on nonfatal injuries and diseases in calculating the net benefits of a sample of environmental and health and safety regulations. Based on various agencies' studies, he incoherence which are based solely on the cost-effectiveness of saving lives are themselves bounded and potentially misleading.70
Taking a broader perspective when making judgments about incoherence will yield different conclusions than result from a comparison made along just one dimension at a time.71
Even though cost-effectiveness of lives saved is at best an incomplete measure of regulatory coherence, it has dominated discussions of regulatory reform in large part because of the relative lack of standardized data needed to use a broader measure such as net social benefits. 72 Methods of analysis vary greatly across regulatory realms, constraining analysts' and decisionmakers' ability to make reliable comparisons of a broader range of social benefits. In some realms decisionmakers rely on cost-effectiveness analysis of lifesaving interventions, while in other realms they seek to discern net benefits.73
Different agenc1es use different methods of valuation and different discount concludes that many regulations still fa il to yield positive net benefits, even when benefits in addition to mortality reduction are estimated. Hahn, supra note 66, at 219-221. 70. Hahn has shown that "[ c ]ost-effectiveness is quite sensitive to the measure that is used," potentially varying by more than a fa ctor of ten depending on how effects other than fa talities are treated. !d. at 229. See also Adler & Posner, supra note 67, at 230 (arguing in favor of cost-benefit analysis because it is a multidimensional approach to decision analysis, capable of incorporating a wide range of fa ctors) .
71. Moreover, judgments about the cost-effectiveness of risk regulation can be affected by other data flaws. For example, the variation in cost-effectiveness across regulations may not be as wide as it would appear from the original and oft-cited OMB table, since many of the most costly regulatory proposals included in that particular table were never promulgated.
Heinzerling, supra note 60, at 20 10. Furthennore, as others have acknowledged, the sample of regulations commonly used as a basis for judging the cost effectiveness of regulation is not a random one. Tengs et al., supra note 61, at 3 72 (noting that their analysis may be affected by selection bias because it is not a random sample of all life-saving interventions). As a result, it may be the case that the "larger view of the broader regulatory landscape" would show that there are "far more numerous examples of balanced, sensible, and cost-effective regulations." BREYER, supra note 4, at 28. Efforts to respond to incoherence may also be motivated by an overestimation of the problem because extreme anomalies are probably more readily available than are sensible consistencies. See Christine lolls, Cass R. Sunstein & Richard Thaler, A Behavioral Approach to Law and Economics, 50 STAN. L. REv. 1471, 1477 (1998) (discussing the effects of the availability heuristic on decisionmaking).
72. Cost-effectiveness analysis also avoids controversies that surround the valuation of human lives and the kinds of cognitive difficulties that attend to valuing other social benefits in monetary terms. Nevertheless, there would almost certainly be more attention to comparing net benefits across agencies than at present if there were better, more standardized data available. rates. Many agencies do not quantify social benefits . 74 Others are prohibited by statute fr om considering the costs of their decisions. 75 With varied decisionrnaking standards and analytic methods across and within regulatory realms, it is exceedingly difficult to gather and systematically compare data in order to provide a more comprehensive evaluation of regulatory coherence. fall across more than one dimension.82 It seems plausible that the two kinds of coherence I have distinguished here, namely instrumental and comparative coherence, are not well correlated and in fact may align along diffe rent dimensions. If so, then even if all policy actors were fully to consider both kinds of coherence, their policy preferences could be arrayed in such a way as to make impossible a coherent collective ordering of their preferences fo r different kinds of coherence.
To be sure, policy fragmentation and the diffusion of multiple actors has its defenders, and for good reason.83 Robust, pluralistic policymaking may well be less coherent than rule by elite guardians, but its messiness could simply be a necessary price of democratic decisionmaking.84 In addition, dividing up the policy space can encourage the kind of specialization needed to enact policies that make more instrumental sense, and perhaps at the end of the day that matters more than complete comparative coherence.85 A division of policymaking authority may also foster healthy competition and the kind of innovation that is necessary for a good legal system.86
The irony, of course, is that the same fragmentation that reinforces category-bound thinking and leads to incoherent policy judgments also confounds efforts to assess and address the problem of incoherence due to the resulting incompatibilities in methods of data collection and policy analysis.
To evaluate regulatory incoherence in a systematically coherent way, those interested in improving government regulation will need to consider more than just one dimension of regulatory policies at a time and will need standardized data across these various dimensions. They will need to seek to understand better whether incoherence exists, how significant and pervasive it is, and whether gains in coherence would be worth any possible costs in terms of the 82. KENNETH J. ARROW, SOCIAL CHOICE AND INDIVIDUAL VA LUES I 0-1 1 ( 1951 ). 83. As Sunstein et al. note, "coherence is not a trumping value, and a system displaying incoherence may well be better than one that is coherent but pervasively unjust."' Sunstein et al., supra note 8, at 1203. 84. ROBERT A. DAHL, DEMOCRACY AND ITS CRITICS 78-79 ( 1989) . 85. The absence of intercircuit stare decisis among appellate courts, for example, would seem inevitably to lead to incoherence since it penn its a national law to be interpreted and administered in one circuit in ways that are completely at odds with how it is interpreted and administered in another circuit. Yet it has been argued that this approach fosters intercircuit dialogue that "is likely to result in better decisions, as it will produce a more careful and fo cused consideration of the issues." Samuel Estreicher & Richard L. Revesz, No nacquiescence by Federal Administrative Agencies, 98 YALE L.J. 679, 736 (I 989). For a similar discussion suggesting that the fragmented organizational structure of the U.S. Congress may promote better policymaking, see KREHBIEL, supra note 77, at 245; KING, supra note 5, at 144-45 .. 86. For example, Japan's system of compensation fo r automobile accidents is thought to be more coherent than that found in the United States, but Japan has achieved its greater consistency by creating a more rigid, less adaptable legal system, which may create problems of its own. Takao Tanase, Th e Ma nagement of Disputes: Automobile Accident Compensation in Japan, 24 LAW & Soc ' y REv. 65 1, 68 1 ( 1990). values served by pluralistic diffusion.87 Perhaps this is partly what Sunstein et al. have in mind when they acknowledge that it is not "easy or even possible for people to agree on what full coherence actually requires."88 In addition to the difficulty of agreeing on full coherence, however, it may also be neither easy nor possible for people to agree on what the obvious anomalies are, or on whether and how to address them. CONCLUSION Sunstein et al. 's article raises important concerns about regulatory policy and the design of regulatory institutions. In articulating a cognitive basis for incoherent decisionmaking and identifying extensive, even puzzling, variation in regulatory policies, they lay down an ambitious challenge for reducing incoherence across regulatory policies. Yet in calling attention to some of the predictable consequences of making policy one case at a time, they also reveal that these same cognitive tendencies, in particular category-bound thinking, can affect judgments about the incoherence of government regulation. Evaluations of regulatory incoherence can be, and perhaps predictably will be, bounded themselves. For this reason, rooting out incoherence will be more difficult than might be hoped, because policies that appear incoherent when evaluated narrowly may not be so incoherent after all. Policy differences that appear to be incoherent will in some cases instead be fully justified. The challenge for those who share the aspiration for systematic rationality in law is therefore to probe still more deeply and more broadly, and to search for a better understanding of the extent of regulatory incoherence, the tensions between instrumental and comparative coherence, and the institutional reform strategies that will ultimately make the most sense.
